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Abstract—This paper studies the procurement and pricing of
inertial response using a frequency-constrained unit commitment
formulation, which co-optimizes the provision of energy and inertia
services while accounting for their complementary properties. The
proposed approach builds on a two-step process that allows to
differentiate between the units being online for energy purposes and
the ones committed additionally solely for inertia provision. Subse-
quently, three novel pricing and payment schemes that reimburse
inertia providers in a transparent and fair manner according to their
individual participation are proposed. The analysis considers both
synchronous and converter-based generators and provides insights
regarding the impact of each pricing scheme on total system cost,
as well as on the investment signals for technologies capable of
offering affordable inertial response. The results show that all three
methods will have a beneficial impact on frequency stability and
aid the operator in ensuring system reliability, whereas the policy
implications to different inertia providing units will vary between
the payment schemes.
Index Terms—Unit commitment, low-inertia grid, frequency con-
straints, inertia valuation, inertia pricing.
I. INTRODUCTION
CURRENT strategies for power system operation and theexisting market architecture were designed in a context
where conventional generators (e.g., hydro, coal or gas units)
were dominating. The spinning turbines of these generators
are synchronized to the grid frequency and their large rotating
masses naturally provide the necessary physical inertia to contain
frequency deviations caused by sudden power imbalances. Nowa-
days however, increasing shares of Renewable Energy Sources
(RES) with null marginal cost are displacing the more expensive
Synchronous Generators (SGs). Considering that RES units are
typically interfaced to the grid via power electronics and therefore
do not provide physical inertia to the network, the ability of
the power system to dampen frequency changes is diminished.
In case of insufficient inertial response, large disturbances will
result in fast frequency dynamics and high Rate-of-Change-of-
Frequency (RoCoF), which may even lead to disconnection of
generators or loads [1].
In view of this new operational paradigm, inertia cannot be
viewed anymore just as byproduct of the power provision from
synchronous generators. In addition, existing frequency control
mechanisms such as droop response by frequency containment
reserves are not able to instantly reduce frequency changes
following a disturbance [2]. To this end, it becomes imperative
to design new market mechanisms and tailored market prod-
ucts that are able to adequately reward the provision of Fast
Frequency Response (FFR) services from existing sources, i.e.,
synchronous generators, and provide correct price signals, that
will incentivize new investments in units that can contribute to
the inertial response of the power system such as fast frequency-
responsive loads (e.g., heat pumps, batteries) or synthetic inertial
response from wind generation. In the meantime, the new market
mechanisms should allow the system operator to express its
willingness to pay for these services dynamically, depending on
system conditions and the scarcity of FFR services.
Motivated by the above considerations, the system operator
in Great Britain (National Grid) has designed new frequency
regulation products to bring more fast-acting assets into the
system [3]. In the same vein, a new FFR reserve will be rolled out
in the Nordic synchronous area [4] in spring of 2020. These are
distinct products tailored to enhance the fast frequency response
of the system. However, being traded in separate markets, i.e.,
unbundled from energy, may fail to capture the complementarity
between inertia and energy services and consequently increase
the total system cost.
Following a different approach, Eirgrid in Ireland has in-
troduced a Synchronous Inertial Response (SIR) constraint to
ensure that the available inertia does not fall below a static limit
of 23 000 MW s [5]. However, as this mechanism remunerates
service providers based on an annual tariff, it does not reflect
the instantaneous value of inertia for the system. On the other
hand, the system operator in Texas (ERCOT) performs a dynamic
dimensioning of Responsive Reserve Services (RRS) that are
used to maintain the reliability of the grid during low-inertia
situations [6]. Since energy and RRS are co-optimized, the re-
sulting prices account for the fact that these products compete for
the same generation capacity. Nonetheless, RRS bundle various
services (load resources with under-frequency relays, governor
response and frequency restoration provided by generators after
a frequency event) that have different contributions to frequency
response and are not necessarily reflective of inertia provision.
This makes the accurate definition of RRS requirements even
more complex, specifically in terms of inertia, and it dilutes the
price signals to the assets that truly contribute to inertial response.
Previous works in [7] and [8] have quantified the value of
inertia as the decrease in total cost of a frequency-constrained
Unit Commitment (UC) model when including cost-free syn-
thetic inertia. These studies showcase the benefits in terms of
operational cost from enlarging the pool of inertia providers, but
they disregard the costs of converter-interfaced generators and do
not discuss any pricing issues. This is a non-trivial problem as the
discrete nature of inertia, depending on the on/off status of the
SGs, introduces pricing complexities when integrating frequency
constraints. In order to circumvent the underlying issues, several
studies use a linearized version of these constraints. A marginal
pricing scheme is proposed in [9] based on linear constraints fitted
to simulation data. Authors in [10] focus on pricing frequency
response services of varying quality (i.e., with different response
times) using a two-sided Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction, where
the preferences of the system operator for each service are
reflected in different utility functions. Finally, the work in [11]
presents a marginal pricing scheme for frequency services based
on a Mixed-Integer Second-Order Cone Program (MISOCP)
formulation of the frequency-security constraints. However, while
the resulting prices provide reasonable incentives to the inertia
providers, they do not guarantee cost recovery of all synchronous
generators. Moreover, the frequency response from different unit
types is characterized solely by the response time, which fails
to capture the fundamental differences in inertia provision from
conventional and converter-based generators.
In this work, we study the procurement and pricing of iner-
tial response using a frequency-constrained UC problem, which
co-optimizes the provision of energy and inertia services ac-
counting endogenously for their complementary properties. By
incorporating the analytic expressions for frequency constraints
in our UC model, we perform a dynamic dimensioning of
FFR reserve requirements instead of using exogenously defined
static requirements. The proposed approach builds on a two-step
process, akin to the reliability UC mechanism that is already
implemented in various markets in the United States [12]. Such
arrangement allows to differentiate between the units being online
for energy purposes and the ones committed additionally solely
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2for inertia provision. We contribute to the ongoing discussion
on FFR market design by proposing three pricing and payment
schemes that reimburse inertia providers in a transparent and fair
manner according to their individual participation. We analyze
how these pricing schemes can lower system cost by attracting
new investments in technologies capable of offering inertia at
lower cost, such as grid-supporting converter control schemes
that employ droop and Virtual Inertia (VI) algorithms providing
synthetic inertia and Fast Frequency Control (FFC) services at a
more competitive cost than SGs [13].
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we derive the post-contingency frequency dynamics and the
corresponding analytic expressions are incorporated into the UC
model. The economic valuation of inertia provision and the notion
of inertia substitution are explained in Section III. Section IV
presents the three proposed inertia pricing schemes and the
corresponding payments to participating units. Section V analyzes
the performance of each pricing method on an illustrative system
and on a larger test case with and without the inclusion of
virtual inertia. Finally, Section VI draws the main conclusions
and discusses the outlook of the study.
II. FREQUENCY-CONSTRAINED UNIT COMMITMENT
A. Frequency Dynamics in a Low-Inertia System
We employ a frequency response model of a generic low-
inertia system previously proposed and described in [14], [15]
that comprises both traditional and converter-interfaced genera-
tors. The generator dynamics are modeled by the swing equation
and governor control, whereas the converter control schemes
encompass both droop and virtual inertia-based approaches, being
the two of the currently most prevalent grid-supporting control
techniques in the literature [16]–[18]. By employing a set of
trivial mathematical operations and assumptions on the parameter
selection, the time-domain evolution of the frequency deviation
after a step disturbance ∆P ∈ R can be computed analytically,
which subsequently yields the expressions for frequency metrics
of interest such as frequency nadir (∆fmax ∈ R), RoCoF
(f˙max ∈ R) and steady-state frequency deviation (∆fss ∈ R):
∆fmax = − ∆P
D +Rg
(
1 +
√
T (Rg − Fg)
M
e−ζωntm
)
, (1a)
f˙max = f˙(t
+
0 ) = −
∆P
M
, ∆fss = − ∆P
D +Rg
. (1b)
In (1a), ζ ∈ R>0 is the damping ratio, ωn ∈ R>0 is the natural
frequency and tm ∈ R≥0 is the time instance of frequency
nadir. More details on the mathematical formulation, variable
definitions and model validation can be found in [15].
It can be observed that the relevant frequency metrics are
directly dependent on the aggregate system parameters, namely
total inertia M ∈ R>0, damping D ∈ R>0, droop gain
Rg ∈ R≥0 and fraction of total power generated by the high-
pressure turbines of synchronous machines Fg ∈ R≥0, and thus
they could be influenced through UC decisions. In particular,
RoCoF and steady-state deviation can be explicitly controlled via
f˙max ∼M−1 and ∆fss ∼ (D+Rg)−1, while nadir can be mod-
eled using a highly nonlinear function ∆fmax (M,D,Rg, Fg).
B. RoCoF Constraint for Inertia Valuation and Pricing
With special interest in inertia, the most relevant constraint of
the three presented in (1) is the limit on maximum instantaneous
RoCoF in (1b), with the aggregate inertia constant M being the
only decision variable. The quasi steady-state frequency deviation
is affected solely by the damping and generator droop constants,
whereas the frequency nadir depends on all aforementioned
variables. In our previous work in [14], we have observed that
violating the RoCoF threshold tends to be drastically more
common than reaching the critical nadir limit, thus suggesting
that the RoCoF constraint is generally the binding one and
therefore the most relevant when looking at the valuation and
pricing of inertia. Moreover, several inertia market reports from
different Transmission System Operators (TSOs) have focused
solely on RoCoF, claiming that its impact on inertia levels is
more important than the one of nadir [19], [20]. Indeed, RoCoF
is an instantaneous metric related to islanding and protection
scheme issues, whereas nadir affects mostly load shedding and
can be regulated in real-time using FFC provision from converter-
interfaced generation. Given the above reasons, this work focuses
on pricing inertia to meet the RoCoF constraint requirements.
C. Unit Commitment Formulation
Here, we first provide the mathematical formulation of the
frequency-constrained UC model comprising only synchronous
generators, and subsequently extend it by including the VI units.
1) UC without Virtual Inertia: Let us denote by T the index
set of different time periods and by I, J and N the index
sets of conventional generators, wind farms and nodes in the
network, respectively. The mathematical formulation of the UC
model without VI provision is given by
min
Φ
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
(
CSUi yit + Cipit
)
(2a)
s.t. ∑
i∈I
pit +
∑
j∈J
Wjt − Lnt = 0, ∀n, t, (2b)
uit − ui(t−1) ≤ uiτ1 , ∀i, t ≥ 1, (2c)
ui(t−1) − uit ≤ 1− uiτ0 , ∀i, t ≥ 1, (2d)
yit ≥ uit − ui(t−1), ∀i, t ≥ 1 (2e)
Piuit ≤ pit ≤ P iuit, ∀i, t, (2f)
kit =
P i∑
i∈I P i
uit, ∀i, t, (2g)
Mt =
∑
i∈I
2Hikit, ∀i, t, (2h)
f˙lim
f0
Mt ≥ |∆Pt|, ∀t, (2i)
pit, kit ≥ 0,∀i, t; δnt ≥ 0,∀n, t;Mt ≥ 0,∀t;
uit, yit ∈ {0, 1},∀i, t, (2j)
where Φ = {pit, uit, yit, kit,∀i, t; δnt,∀n, t;Mt,∀t} is the set of
optimization variables.
The objective function (2a) to be minimized is the total system
cost that comprises the fuel and the start-up costs, denoted by Ci
and CSUi , respectively. Equality constraint (2b) enforces the nodal
power balance, with pit being the power output of SG unit i ∈ I,
Wjt referring to the power output of wind farm j ∈ J , and Lnt
representing the demand at node n ∈ N . Constraints (2c)-(2d)
model the minimum online and offline time of conventional units
based on commitment variable uit ∈ {0, 1}, while parameters
τ1g and τ
0 are defined as τ1 = min{t + T 1g − 1, T} and τ0 =
min{t+T 0g −1, T}, where T 1g and T 0g denote the duration of time
for which unit i should remain online and offline, respectively.
Constraint (2e) models the start-up of conventional units using the
binary variables yit ∈ {0, 1}. The scheduled energy production is
bounded by the minimum and maximum generation limits in (2f).
The set of constraints (2g)-(2i) captures the frequency dynamics
of the system and imposes RoCoF thresholds, with f0 = 50 Hz
being the nominal frequency. In particular, equality (2g) defines
kit as the ratio of the installed power capacity of generator
i and the total system capacity multiplied by the binary unit
commitment variable uit. Expression (2h) introduces the average
system variable for inertia, while (2i) enforces the RoCoF limit
dependent on the predefined parameter f˙lim prescribed by the
system operator [21]. Finally, (2j) declares the decision variables.
32) UC with Virtual Inertia: Let us denote by V ⊆ J the subset
of wind farms equipped with batteries for provision of VI. The
optimization problem (2) is therefore augmented as follows:
min
Φ
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
(
CSUi yit + Cipit
)
+
∑
t∈T
∑
v∈V
CVIv hvt (3a)
s.t. constraints (2b)-(2j),
kvt =
pvt∑
v∈V P v
, ∀v, t, (3b)
Pv ≤ pvt ≤ P v, ∀v, t, (3c)
hit = 2HiP iuit, ∀i, t, (3d)
hvt = 2Hvpvt, ∀v, t (3e)
MSGt =
∑
i∈I
2Hikit, ∀t, (3f)
MVIt =
∑
v∈V
2Hvkvt, ∀t, (3g)
Mt =
MSGt
∑
i∈I P i +M
VI
t
∑
v∈V P v∑
i∈I P i +
∑
v∈V P v
, ∀t, (3h)
hit ≥ 0,∀i, t; pvt, kvt, hvt ≥ 0,∀v, t, (3i)
with Φ = {pit, uit, yit, kit, hit,∀i, t; δnt,∀n, t; pvt, kvt, hvt,∀v, t;
Mt,M
SG
t ,M
VI
t , ∀t} being the set of optimization variables and
CVIv reflecting the cost of VI for each wind generator v ∈ V .
Expression (3b) defines the power scaling factors kvt of wind
farms providing VI1 as a function of the respective battery
power output pvt, bounded by the upper and lower limits in
(3c), whereas constraints (3d)-(3e) describe the individual inertia
constants2 of each conventional and VI-providing generator re-
spectively. The aggregate inertia contributions from synchronous
and converter-interfaced generators are accounted for in (3f)-(3g),
(3h) defines the global system inertia as a weighted average of
inertia gains provided by SGs and wind farms, while (3i) declares
the new decision variables.
III. ECONOMIC VALUATION OF INERTIA
A. Value of Inertia for the TSO
The consideration of minimum inertia requirements for a TSO
raises the question of how much these requirements will cost.
To assess the economic value of inertia, the UC results can be
used to determine the difference in system costs with and without
inertia requirements, which would in turn provide an upper bound
of the value of inertia for the TSO.
As an illustrative example, Table I shows the breakdown of
UC costs for the modified IEEE RTS-96 system from [22], for
cases with and without inertia requirements. Several conclusions
can be drawn from Table I. First, it is clear that the inclusion
of inertia requirements has a significant impact on the system
cost, with the total commitment costs increasing by 162 100e,
which indicates that the newly committed SGs are needed solely
for satisfying the inertia requirements. Finally, a large increase
in generator dispatch costs reflects the energy produced by the
SGs additionally committed for inertia purposes, thus suggesting
that they are operating at their technical minimum.
It can be concluded from the aforementioned results that the
difference in cost between these two cases of 162 100e can be
used as an indicator for defining the price at which the TSO
values inertia. In other words, this sum represents the maximum
amount the TSO would be willing to pay for procuring inertia
from other units.
1Note that the VI scaling factors kvt are conceptually different from the SG
scaling factors kit in (2g), since the time-variant aspect comes from the active
power output pvt of the VI device and not the binary decision variable uvt. This
is justified by the fact that the VI devices are assumed to always be online (i.e.,
available for FFR provision) and hence uvt = 1, ∀v, t.
2Due to discrete nature of the objective function (3a), the inertia constants hit
and hvt are expressed in MWs2.
TABLE I
UC COSTS [e] WITH AND WITHOUT INERTIA REQUIREMENTS.
Case Total cost Start-up cost Energy cost
w/o inertia requirements 407 500 600 406 900
w/ inertia requirements 569 600 3 500 566 100
B. Inertia Substitution
Authors in [7] and [8] employ the method of adding “free”
inertia to a frequency-constrained unit commitment and defining
the decrease in total costs resulting from this addition as the value
of inertia. Such concept displaces the more expensive inertia
provided by synchronous generators with the cheap inertia and
simultaneously preserves the total system-level inertia constant.
While adding free inertia to the system is an effective tool for
understanding the marginal inertia cost of the traditional SG
portfolio, it does not reflect the cost of inertia provision for
converter-interfaced generators. Building on a similar approach,
the technique used in this work is to include the continuous inertia
slack variable M+t ∈ R≥0 in the RoCoF constraint of the UC
problem, with an associated cost C+ present in the objective
function. The RoCoF constraint (2i) is thus reformulated as
f˙lim
f0
(Mt + M
+
t ) ≥ |∆Pt|, ∀t, whereas the objective function
(2a) is adapted accordingly:
min
Φ
∑
t∈T
∑
i∈I
(
CSUi yit + Cipit
)
+
∑
t∈T
C+M+t . (4)
It should be noted that the virtual inertia is not considered in this
case, as it will later replace the slack variable. Using the described
method, a certain cost C+ for which the additional inertia is no
longer profitable can be found, reflected by the optimizer deciding
to commit conventional generators instead.
For illustration purposes, the UC is ran on the previously
described test case for a wide range of C+ values. For each
run, the amount of extra inertia purchased by the system is
recorded, with the final results illustrated in Fig. 1. Interestingly,
the relationship between M+ and C+ is reminiscent of a demand
curve and it can be interpreted in a similar fashion. The main
difference compared to a traditional demand curve lies in the
fact that the total amount of system inertia does not change for
different values of M+. More precisely, the RoCoF constraint
ensures that the minimum amount of inertia needed for system
stability is obtained, and including cheaper inertia does not
increase the total inertia in the system but rather substitutes
more expensive inertia provided by conventional synchronous
generators instead. This effect is clearly reflected by distinctive
steps in the extra inertia cost curve, with each step corresponding
to an SG being displaced by a unit with cheaper inertia provision.
Eventually, at M+ ≈ 8 MW s2 the system does not purchase
any more slack inertia despite it being free. This is justified by
the fact that all expensive SGs, initially committed solely for
providing inertia and meeting the frequency requirements, have
now been decommissioned and replaced by addition of cheap
inertia. Similarly, the extra inertia will not be procured at a
cost higher than 6000e/MW s2, since it is more expensive than
having all necessary SGs come online.
Fig. 1. Cost curve of additional inertia provision.
4IV. INERTIA PRICING & PAYMENT METHODS
In this section, three novel methods for pricing and payment
of inertia are proposed. In particular, the prices are derived from
the UC model by obtaining the dual variables of the respective
constraints. Nonetheless, this procedure requires to relax the
original Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) form of the UC
problem into a Linear Program (LP) whose dual variables are
defined explicitly. For instance, the price of energy is determined
as the dual of the power balance constraint, and there are three
alternative price models for obtaining this dual [12]: (i) the
restricted model; (ii) the dispatchable model; and (iii) the convex
hull model.
In the restricted model, binary variables u are set to the optimal
value u∗ according to the solution of the preceding MILP and the
optimization problem is solved again in the LP form. In contrast,
the pricing in the dispatchable model is obtained by allowing
binary variables to vary continuously in the range 0 ≤ u ≤ 1.
Finally, the convex hull model seeks to approximate the non-
convex aggregate cost function with a convex hull function [12].
In this paper we will solely focus on the restricted model for
price determination, given that the main goal of our work is to
investigate alternative inertia pricing schemes and not to focus
on the non-convex nature of the UC problem. Indeed, while the
convex hull method sidesteps the non-convexity issues it is also
very computationally intensive, whereas the dispatchable model
introduces errors in the inertia calculation based on variable u.
A. Issues Pertaining to Negative SG Profits
The inclusion of inertia requirements in the UC forces a
dispatch of additional SGs solely for the purpose of providing
rotational inertia, which in turn preserves the frequency deviation
within prescribed limits after a fault. Under such circumstances,
the expensive SGs are started up and operated at their technical
minimum to ensure grid stability. Nonetheless, with extra units
coming online, the total generator profits are affected, which
in turn calls for the establishment of proper reimbursement
mechanisms to make whole those units which should be part of
the efficient dispatch but are not supported by the current prices.
The increase in the number of online SGs can potentially lead
to negative profits for units committed solely for inertia purposes,
as they are dispatched out of the energy merit order. Indeed,
the hourly price of energy is determined as the marginal cost of
supplying the load. However, if more expensive generators come
online to provide inertia by operating at the technical minimum,
their marginal costs will not be reflected in the energy price.
Hence, their fuel costs remain above the market price which
eventually leads to negative revenue. In addition to the loss in
the Energy-Only Market (EOM), they also face losses from the
start-up costs. The issue of generators facing negative profits
is important as there is no incentive for them to come online
for inertia provision. The TSO must therefore create payment
mechanisms to reimburse SGs and encourage cheaper and more
efficient technologies to provide inertia.
B. Limitations of Obtaining Duals from RoCoF Constraint
To obtain a price for inertia and create payments to units pro-
viding it, the constraint of interest is the upper bound on RoCoF
imposed in (2i). Due to non-convexity issues, obtaining a dual
from such constraint is not straightforward. When considering SG
units, the cost of providing inertia is linked to both the start-up
costs and the fuel costs. The former costs depend on the binary
commitment variables which complicates the extraction of the
dual variables. Indeed, when only considering inertia provided by
SGs, the RoCoF constraint is satisfied by committing a certain
amount of generators. However, since the inertia comes in steps
due to the binary nature of the problem, the constraint will be
satisfied once the threshold is exceeded, but it will (almost) never
be equal to the exact limit. Therefore, the dual of the RoCoF
constraint would be zero in this particular case.
Therefore, the main issue to be addressed in order to extract
a meaningful RoCoF dual variable is the discrete online/offline
Run UC without frequency (RoCoF) constraints
Determine online units & missing inertia
Run UC with frequency (RoCoF) constraints
Determine inertia-providing units
Pay respective units according to chosen method
Fig. 2. Proposed methodology for determining inertia payments.
characteristic of SGs and the fact that they do not provide inertia
in a continuous manner. Hence, a straightforward approach to
obtain a RoCoF dual variable would be to set the SG inertia as
a continuous variable and rewrite constraint (2g) as
0 ≤ kit ≤ P i∑
i∈I P i
uit, ∀i, t. (5)
The aggregate inertia remains equal to Mt =
∑
i∈I 2Hikit,∀t,
and is therefore transformed into a continuous variable.
While such formulation enables SGs to artificially provide
inertia in a continuous fashion, it still does not yield a meaningful
RoCoF dual variable. More precisely, the problem lies in the
fact that there is no direct cost associated with Mt in the
objective function (2a). Duals represent how a change in the
respective constraint would affect the value of the objective
function. However, the cost of inertia provision from SGs is
not explicitly included in the objective function, but it is in fact
“hidden” in the start-up and fuel costs.
On the other hand, when considering virtual inertia in the UC,
a non-zero dual variable can be obtained for RoCoF constraint.
Nevertheless, it only takes the bid-in cost CVIv of converter-
interfaced units into account, since the objective function (3a)
has an explicit cost term CVIv hvt for purchasing VI. This however
does not resolve the aforementioned issue pertaining to traditional
SG units providing inertia, as their costs are still not captured in
the existing price setting mechanism. Hence, alternative pricing
methods must be developed instead.
C. Proposed Inertia Pricing and Payment Methods
Three novel methods for pricing and payment of inertia for all
participating units are developed in this study, all using the same
two-step UC algorithm described in Fig. 2. The main purpose
of this algorithm is to differentiate between the units being
online for energy purposes and the ones committed additionally
solely for inertia provision. This breakdown allows payment
schemes to reimburse units in a fair manner according to their
individual participation. Moreover, the proposed two-step process
is analogous to the well-known two-step reliability commitment
process [12]. The proposed pricing methods are described in
detail in the remainder of this sections.
1) Ex-Post Price Calculation: The first pricing method is
based on ex post calculations of the inertia price. Motivated by
the clearing price determination in an EOM, this method aims
at setting the price of inertia provision as the cost of the most
expensive unit supplying the inertia demand.
Let us assume obtaining a dual λHt ,∀t from the RoCoF
constraint (2i), which would in this case represent the cost of
procuring virtual inertia. In order to include the costs incurred to
SGs providing rotational inertia into analysis, the following price
structure is introduced:
λˆHt = max
{
λHt , λ
SG
t
}
, ∀t ∈ T , (6)
with λˆHt being the marginal value of inertia provision at hour t
and λSGt = maxi∈M+
{(
max
{
Ci − µt, 0
}
pit + C
SU
i
)
uit/hit
}
determining the cost of the most expensive SG unit online (and
hence providing inertia);M+ ∈ N represents the set of additional
5SGs committed in the second UC run and µt is the dual of the
power balance constraint corresponding to the energy price.
According to (6), the price of inertia is defined as the cost of
the most expensive unit (VI or SG) supplying inertia. The SG
costs are obtained by combining the EOM losses, assuming the
generator is in fact facing any, together with the start-up costs,
and subsequently dividing it by the amount of inertia provided.
Once the price is determined, units get reimbursed through Inertia
Payments (IP) based on the previously determined price λˆHt and
the quantity of inertia that they provide (hit for SGs and hvt for
VI providers), scaled accordingly as follows:
IPit = λˆ
H
t
hit
∑
i∈I P i∑
i∈I P i +
∑
v∈V P v
, ∀i, t, (7a)
IPvt = λˆ
H
t
hvt
∑
v∈V P v∑
i∈I P i +
∑
v∈V P v
, ∀v, t. (7b)
2) Utility Function: In Section III-A it was shown that the
financial resources the TSO would be willing to spend on inertia
can be quantified. Indeed, for the given test system, this value
corresponds to 162 100e for procuring 8 MW s2 and can be
defined as the utility of inertia for the TSO, thus providing
information on how to price the inertia in the system.
In the same vein, this method aims to obtain the relevant
pricing information from the UC by subtracting the utility term
UH
∑
tMt from the objective function (3a), where U
H denotes
the utility of inertia for the entire scheduling horizon. The
cumulative value of UH is previously calculated by running the
UC twice for certain inertia demand: once without frequency
constraints (denoted by “w/o FC”) and once with frequency
constraints and no VI provision (denoted by “w/ FC”). Such
procedure yields the lower and upper bound on system cost,
respectively. The utility of inertia is then determined by
UH =
C
w/ FC
total − Cw/o FCtotal
Hdem
, (8)
with Ctotal referring to the total UC cost. It should be noted that
by inertia demand Hdem we consider the amount of additional
inertia needed to satisfy the frequency requirements after the first
UC run. Since the inertia costs of both VI and SG units are
explicitly included in the objective function, a price for inertia
can be obtained as the dual variable λHt of the RoCoF constraint,
i.e., λˆHt := λ
H
t . The units would subsequently be reimbursed for
inertia provision through the same payment mechanism described
in (7).
3) Uplift Payments: The authors in [19] build on the concept
of uplift payments or “commitment ticket price” for generators
providing inertia, previously introduced in [23]. They define the
additional payments to the units as
piit = C
SU
i − νitP i + νitPi, ∀i, t, (9)
where νit,∀i, t and νit,∀i, t are the duals of the maximum and
minimum unit generation constraints, respectively. The authors
then suggest to include the product IPit = piit yit to the amount
paid to the generators. The main drawback of the suggested
payment lies in the fact that SGs are only compensated during
start-up hours, as the payment is only made when yit > 0. It
implies that the generators facing losses due to energy prices
being lower than their marginal costs are not reimbursed during
operating hours. Furthermore, an additional pricing mechanism
for VI units must be implemented.
In order to resolve the above limitations, the proposition
in this work is to alter the uplift payment such that piit =
CSUi yit + νitPi
3. In contrast to (9), the modified uplift method
3The term νitP i is omitted for simplicity, since the probability of all addi-
tionally committed SGs operating at their technical maximum is rather negligible.
However, the aforementioned term can be also incorporated if needed. Note that
the case studies and results presented in the remainder of the chapter are not
affected by this term.
TABLE II
SMALL TEST SYSTEM DESCRIPTION.
Unit P i/v/Pi/v [MW] Ci [e/MWh] CSUi [e] Hi/v [s]
G1 160/10 10 0 4
G2 100/10 12 300 4
G3 80/10 11 200 4
B1 10/0 − − 10
B2 20/0 − − 10
B3 30/0 − − 10
allows the generators to receive payments for start-up costs as
well as for all time periods in which they face EOM losses, and
not only during the start-up hour. Indeed, the start-up decision
variable yit has been incorporated to reflect the incurred start-
up costs, but SGs will receive additional compensation when
operating at the technical minimum reflected by the expression
νitP
min
i . Nevertheless, such uplift payment is not sufficient for
accurately capturing the costs of VI units. Hence, the VI providers
will be reimbursed according to the dual λHt of the RoCoF
constraint obtained from the optimization, which still reflects the
cost of inertia coming from such units. This dual represents in
fact the VI common clearing price used to reimburse all virtual
inertia units. The proposed payment method thus distinguishes
between a standard shadow price mechanism for VI units and a
reimbursement method based on traditional uplift payments for
conventional SG units.
V. CASE STUDIES
A. Small Test System
In order to gain basic understanding of the proposed pricing
methodologies as well as the economic interactions in a UC, we
first consider a simple system comprising three conventional SGs,
fixed amount of wind generation with constant power output,
and three batteries offering VI capabilities. The most relevant
unit parameters including their normalized inertia constants Hi
and Hv are given in Table II. Note that the cost of batteries is
not included as their bid-in cost for inertia
(
CVIv
)
is the only
cost considered and assumed to be determined by the operators
of VI units. For cases where battery costs are not a varying
parameter, we assume that all batteries bid-in at a fixed price
of CVIv = 50e/MW s
2. This allows for dispatching of VI
without completely removing the need for SGs, thus making the
comparison between payment methods more comprehensive.
We consider an 8-hour scheduling horizon with the load de-
mand varying between 180 MWh and 200 MWh, and a constant
wind energy output of 150 MWh at each hour. The inertia de-
mand is dictated by the requirement for withstanding a predefined
change in active power of ∆P = (1, 1, 15, 25, 33, 33, 30, 10)×
10−3 p.u. throughout the scheduling horizon, with smaller values
indirectly corresponding to a lower disturbance probability.
B. Large Test System
For a more comprehensive test case, we focus on the IEEE
RTS-96 system [22] previously introduced in Section III-A,
modified into a low-inertia system for the purposes of this study
by adding a large amount of wind generation. For the analysis of
virtual inertia pricing, four VI-controlled batteries are included
in the system, with relevant parameters provided in Table III.
The costs shown are the bid-in costs for virtual inertia, as it is
assumed throughout this work that the battery operators make
TABLE III
PARAMETERS OF VI BATTERY UNITS IN THE LARGE SYSTEM.
Unit Origin P v [MW] Hv [s] CVIv [e/MWs2]
B1 B102 70 12 10
B2 B114 50 12 11
B3 B202 100 12 12
B4 B212 40 12 13
6TABLE IV
BREAKDOWN OF HOURLY UC COSTS [e] FOR Method 1.
Unit Cost H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8
G2
EOM − − − − −20 −20 −20 −
SU − − − − −300 0 0 −
IP − − − − 320 20 20 −
Total − − − − 0 0 0 −
G3
EOM − − − −10 −10 −10 − −
SU − − − −200 0 0 − −
IP − − − 210 65.6 39.5 − −
Total − − − 0 55.6 29.5 − −
decisions on which markets to participate in and thus select the
appropriate bid-in costs to ensure profitable operation. In our
case the battery operators enter the inertia provision market with
a specific bid-in cost and are dispatched only if it is financially
viable for the system. The given costs are not necessarily kept
constant throughout this study and will occasionally be changed
for certain test cases.
The scheduling horizon is a typical 24-hour day-ahead time
period. Demand and wind production profiles are taken from [22].
Moreover, the system is required to be able to maintain frequency
within prescribed thresholds after a disturbance of ∆P = 0.1 p.u.
at each hour of the day.
The following sections present the performance of each pricing
method on both the small and the large test system, as well as
with and without the inclusion of virtual inertia.
C. Method 1: Ex-Post Price Calculation
1) Small test system: Without enforcing constraints on inertia,
only G1 is needed to supply the demand. The total UC cost is
3360e and G1 makes zero profit since it is the only generator
online and thus sets the EOM price (equal to 10e/MWh). With
the addition of inertia requirements, units G2 and G3 come online
for 3 hours each, resulting in a 590e increase in UC cost. Due to
EOM price remaining the same, both units face losses from the
EOM and start-up costs, leading to negative profits of −360e
and −230e for G2 and G3 respectively. Table IV provides more
insights regarding the revenue, costs, payments and profits for
G2 and G3 over the 8-hour scheduling horizon.
At hour 4, G3 turns on to provide inertia, and its start-up
and EOM losses are covered by the inertia payments. Moreover,
it turns on before G2 due to its lower operating and start-up
costs. Nevertheless, in the next hour G2 also comes online,
thus becoming the most expensive unit providing inertia. Inertia
payments therefore cover its losses, resulting in G3 making
positive profit as it is no longer the most expensive unit providing
inertia. Similar situation occurs at hour 6. Finally, in the next hour
G3 turns off and inertia payments cover the losses of generator
G2. Overall, G2 and G3 now have respective profits of 0e
and 85.1e. The proposed payment method is thus successful in
resolving negative profit issues and ensures that all units receive
a common clearing inertia price.
TABLE V
HOURLY SG PROFITS [e] UNDER Method 1 PRICING SCHEME.
H\G G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19 G20
H1 915 915 926 1164 891 0 0 0 1531 0 915 915 926 1164 891 0 0 0 1531 959
H2 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H3 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H4 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H5 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H6 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H7 75 75 214 -161 116 0 3966 3966 69 0 75 75 -46 -96 116 0 3966 3966 69 171
H8 -143 -143 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 0 65 65 0 274 94 0 4424 4424 39 145
H9 -143 -143 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 0 65 65 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 145
H10 -143 -143 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 0 65 65 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 145
H11 65 65 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 0 65 65 0 338 94 0 4424 4424 39 145
H12 70 70 -23 0 105 0 4195 4195 54 0 70 70 217 0 105 0 4195 4195 54 158
H13 70 70 -23 0 105 0 4195 4195 54 0 70 70 217 0 105 0 4195 4195 54 158
H14 166 166 -442 -1091 313 0 0 0 325 0 166 166 167 -1091 313 0 0 0 325 401
H15 211 211 -442 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H16 211 211 -442 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H17 211 211 -442 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H18 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H19 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 73 211 211 214 0 346 0 0 0 394 504
H20 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 378 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 1107
H21 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 378 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 1107
H22 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 378 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 1107
H23 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 378 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 1107
H24 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 378 464 464 377 0 631 0 -723 -723 872 1107
Fig. 3. EOM price with and without frequency constraints.
2) Large test system: We investigate the performance of
Method 1 on a larger system by analyzing the hourly profits
of all 20 generators given in Table V, with green and red fields
indicating positive and negative hourly profits, respectively. The
effectiveness of the payment scheme is clearly reflected in the
vast majority of SG units achieving positive profits for most of
the hours. The generators facing negative profits at some instances
are the units participating in the EOM that suffer losses due to a
decrease in energy price. More precisely, the inertia requirements
and changed commitment of the system result in lower EOM
prices and therefore reduced profits for units (see Fig. 3). This
decrease in energy price is caused by the generators having to
reduce their energy output to accommodate the extra energy
in the system due to additional generators, mostly operating at
their technical minimum, coming online. At certain times, this
decrease of energy output is large enough to reduce the price.
3) Inclusion of Virtual Inertia: The proposed method performs
well with the addition of virtual inertia, but issues appear once
the cost of VI provision becomes too expensive for the system.
As an illustrative example, let us consider the small test system
and assume a simple case where all VI units bid-in at the same
cost for inertia. According to (6), as this cost increases so do the
corresponding inertia payments. However, a price threshold exists
at which these payments exceed the corresponding amount for a
respective case without any VI units in the system, as indicated in
Fig. 4. While counter-intuitive at first, such effect can be justified
by the fact that at certain hours the virtual inertia is cheaper
than the start-up costs of a generator, and the TSO would rather
employ VI instead of committing a conventional SG. However,
the VI costs lead to higher duals in the subsequent hours and
therefore higher total payments for inertia.
D. Method 2: Utility Function
1) Small test system: Similar to the analysis of Method 1,
Table VI showcases the revenue, costs, payments and profits for
Fig. 4. Impact of virtual inertia on total inertia payments under different payment
mechanisms: (i) ex-post calculation; (ii) utility function; (iii) uplift payments.
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BREAKDOWN OF HOURLY UC COSTS [e] FOR Method 2.
Unit Cost H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7 H8
G2
EOM − − − − −20 −20 −20 −
SU − − − − −300 0 0 −
IP − − − − 152 61 144 −
Total − − − − −168 41 124 −
G3
EOM − − − −10 −10 −10 − −
SU − − − −200 0 0 − −
IP − − − 80 31 122 − −
Total − − − −130 21 112 − −
generators 2 and 3 in the small test system under the payment
scheme of Method 2. For the entire scheduling horizon the total
profits of G2 and G3 are −3e and 3e respectively. Despite
having opposite profits, the issue of larger negative profits due
to inertia requirements is resolved by the proposed payment
method. Indeed, if the opposite profits were to be redistributed
ex-post, then both G2 and G3 would break even and thus
be indifferent to being committed for inertia provision. This
symmetry in profits for SGs coming online for inertia provision
is a specific characteristics of the utility function method and will
be elaborated in more detail in the remainder of this section.
2) Large test system: By analyzing the total hourly profits of
individual generators given in Table VII, we can conclude that
in a larger system more units face negative profits compared to
Method 1. There are two explanations for such outcome: (i) the
issue of symmetry already observed in the small system; (ii) the
utility function payment method does not provide compensation
for reduced EOM revenue due to a decrease in energy price.
Indeed, as shown previously in Fig. 3, the inertia requirements
and changed commitment of the system result in lower EOM
prices and therefore reduced unit profits. Such effect is not
captured by this method and certain generators will inevitably
face negative profits and not receive proper reimbursement.
The reason why payments to inertia providers lead to some
generators making the exact opposite profits lies in the fact that
the TSO reimburses them according to the exact amount at which
it values the inertia at each hour, which is the cost of having those
generators online in case no cheaper inertia is available. There
is thus a single price for inertia at each hour, which does not
necessarily correspond to the marginal inertia price (i.e., to the
most expensive unit online), but to a total budget that will be
distributed among providers. Considering that inertia is provided
in discrete steps due to the binary nature of the UC problem,
the total available inertia of additionally committed generators
might end up being higher than the inertia demand Hdem used
in (8). In such instances, the allocation of inertia to each generator
is arbitrary and thus some units might receive disproportionate
payments compared to others during the redistribution of inertia
provision budget. This problem can be resolved by assigning the
exact amount of inertia provided by each generator ex-post, such
that no generator is facing losses. Nevertheless, it is hard to find
TABLE VII
HOURLY SG PROFITS [e] UNDER Method 2 PRICING SCHEME.
H\G G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19 G20
H1 168 168 134 -153 324 0 0 0 364 -1222 168 168 134 -153 324 0 0 0 364 -784
H2 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H3 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H4 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H5 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H6 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H7 -52 -52 79 -96 20 0 3966 3966 -130 -208 -52 -52 -46 -161 20 0 3966 3966 -130 -126
H8 -1 -1 0 274 44 0 4424 4424 -63 -107 -143 -143 0 338 44 0 4424 4424 -63 -8
H9 -106 -106 0 338 -36 0 4424 4424 -228 -280 -143 -143 0 338 -36 0 4424 4424 -228 -254
H10 -13 -13 0 338 34 0 4424 4424 -83 -128 -143 -143 0 338 34 0 4424 4424 -83 -38
H11 12 12 0 338 53 0 4424 4424 -44 -87 12 12 0 338 53 0 4424 4424 -44 21
H12 -1 -1 -23 0 51 0 4195 4195 -57 -116 -1 -1 142 0 51 0 4195 4195 -57 -8
H13 -1 -1 -23 0 51 0 4195 4195 -57 -116 -1 -1 142 0 51 0 4195 4195 -57 -8
H14 -85 -85 -442 -1091 122 0 0 0 -67 -410 -85 -85 -100 -1091 122 0 0 0 -67 -185
H15 30 30 -442 -319 209 0 0 0 111 -223 30 30 22 -319 209 0 0 0 111 82
H16 -23 -23 -442 -412 169 0 0 0 29 -309 -23 -23 -34 -412 169 0 0 0 29 -41
H17 -29 -29 -442 -422 164 0 0 0 20 -319 -29 -29 -40 -422 164 0 0 0 20 -55
H18 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H19 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 -225 28 28 20 -321 208 0 0 0 109 79
H20 8 8 -107 -804 285 0 -723 -723 160 -367 8 8 -107 -804 285 0 -723 -723 160 44
H21 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 -258 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 200
H22 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 -258 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 200
H23 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 -258 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 200
H24 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 -258 75 75 -36 -686 336 0 -723 -723 265 200
TABLE VIII
HOURLY SG PROFITS [e] UNDER Method 3 PRICING SCHEME.
H\G G1 G2 G3 G4 G5 G6 G7 G8 G9 G10 G11 G12 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19 G20
H1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H7 0 0 0 0 0 0 3966 3966 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3966 3966 0 0
H8 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0 0 0 0 274 0 0 4424 4424 0 0
H9 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0
H10 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0
H11 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0 0 0 0 338 0 0 4424 4424 0 0
H12 0 0 0 0 0 0 4195 4195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4195 4195 0 0
H13 0 0 0 0 0 0 4195 4195 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4195 4195 0 0
H14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H19 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H23 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
H24 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
a systematic way in which this procedure should be conducted.
This is in fact a main distinction compared to Method 1, where
the price of inertia is calculated ex-post as the cost of the most
expensive unit coming online for inertia purposes.
3) Inclusion of Virtual Inertia: The addition of virtual iner-
tia creates issues for reimbursement under the utility function
method. More precisely, with the addition of VI units the dual of
the RoCoF constraint yields λHt = U
H
t −CVIv , which could have
negative values for large enough CVIv and result in units paying
to provide inertia. In other words, as virtual inertia becomes more
expensive, less payments will be made to units offering inertia
which goes against the basic market intuition. Such phenomena
can also be seen in Fig. 4 on the example of a small test system
and assuming all VI units bid-in at the same cost. Furthermore,
for CVIv ∈ [150, 200] e/MWs2 the dual becomes negative which
is conceptually problematic.
A possible solution could simply be to set the dual to
λHt = U
H
t , with the TSO always paying U
H regardless of
which technology is providing inertia and at which price. This
would encourage cheaper technologies to enter the market with
the potential for high profits. Such solution is not necessarily a
disadvantage for the TSO. As a matter of fact, the operator could
opt for paying a fixed price for inertia in order to encourage units
with cheaper inertia provision to penetrate the system; once this
is achieved, the TSO can reduce inertia payments.
E. Method 3: Uplift Payments
Applying the uplift method to the small system yields total
inertia payments of 590e, with losses on the EOM and start-
up costs both covered. Therefore, G2 and G3 are left with
zero profits. Similar conclusions can be drawn from the hourly
profit analysis for the larger test case given in Table VIII, where
negative profits of all SGs have been reduced to zero.
Adding virtual inertia does not have any negative impact on the
payments through Method 3. SGs are still compensated to ensure
cost recovery and batteries are reimbursed for VI provision based
on their bids. Inertia payments will always be lower compared
to the case without virtual inertia, as indicated in Fig. 4.
F. Comparison of Payment Methods
We now compare the three payment methods and evaluate them
on a large test system based on several metrics of performance.
Table IX shows the comparison of total system costs and inertia
payments for each pricing scheme, as well as the number of units
facing negative or positive profits. Understandably, all methods
result in the same UC costs and distinguish only between the
amount of final inertia payments. Moreover, they yield the same
commitment and dispatch schedule for all generators. Method 2
is the most affordable for the TSO, with lower inertia payments
compared to the other two mechanisms.
Some interesting observations can be made when studying
different levels of virtual inertia in the system provided in
Table X. In particular, as the VI penetration increases the pay-
ments from Method 1 and Method 3 decrease, while Method 2
8TABLE XI
POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED PAYMENT METHODS WITH DISTINCTIVE ADVANTAGES (GREEN) AND DISADVANTAGES (RED).
Perspective Method 1: Ex-Post Price Method 2: Utility Function Method 3: Uplift Payments
TSO
Incentives for provision of
virtual inertia
Clear financial expectations due to fixed rates for inertia
services
Low payments whenever more
affordable inertia is available
Large inertia payments Same expenses regardless of the available inertiaresources, unless tailor-made utility function is used
No incentives for investment in more
efficient inertia technologies
SGs
High profits − −
− Possible negative profits −
VI units
High profits Clear income expectations Clear market understanding
− Fixed income for inertia provision Low profitability
TABLE IX
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT INERTIA PAYMENT METHODS.
System performance metric Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
Optimal UC solution [e] 569 610 569 610 569 610
Total inertia payments [e] 258 160 162 124 187 948
# units with negative profits 0/18 5/18 0/18
# units with positive profits 18/18 13/18 6/18
remains unaffected. As a result, the uplift payments become
more advantageous for the TSO. Furthermore, by agreeing to pay
a fixed amount with the utility function method, this payment
scheme can become more expensive as more VI units enter
the system. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that
the TSO can choose to re-evaluate the inertia payments under
such circumstances. Finally, Table XI highlights the main policy
implications for all stakeholders involved in the inertia provision.
It is clear that all three methods could improve frequency stability
and aid the operator in ensuring system reliability. On the
other hand, the policy implications to different inertia providers
might vary between the payment schemes. Nevertheless, taking
all aspects into account, the uplift payments appear to be the
most beneficial and practical method of the three. This can be
justified on several grounds: (i) the fundamental concepts are
already familiar to certain operators; (ii) the method does not
require additional ex-post calculations; (iii) such payment scheme
does not alter the standard UC formulation; and (iv) it prevents
excessively high payments to inertia providers.
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes three inertia pricing schemes as well as
the appropriate methods for reimbursement of respective inertia
providers in a transparent and fair manner according to their
individual participation. In particular, the focus is on applying the
ex-post calculation, utility function and uplift payments, respec-
tively, for determining the appropriate market price for inertial
response. A two-step approach based on a frequency-constrained
unit commitment formulation is employed, which co-optimizes
the provision of energy and inertia services while accounting for
their complementary properties and differentiating between the
units being online for energy purposes and the ones committed
additionally solely for inertia provision. The analysis includes
both traditional synchronous generators and converter-based units
providing virtual inertia, and gives insights into the impact of
each pricing scheme on total system cost and its potential for
attracting more affordable providers of inertial response. The
results indicate that all three methods could have a beneficial
impact on frequency stability and aid the operator in ensuring
system reliability. While the policy implications to different
TABLE X
COMPARISON OF TOTAL INERTIA PAYMENTS [e] UNDER DIFFERENT LEVELS
OF VI INSTALLATION IN THE SYSTEM.
VI installation Method 1 Method 2 Method 3
0% 258 160 162 124 187 948
10% 245 195 162 124 162 938
20% 156 725 162 124 138 231
35% 135 849 162 124 116 765
inertia providers might vary depending on the payment schemes,
the uplift payments appear to be the most beneficial and practical
method of the three. This also opens the avenue for future work
on integration of inertia provision in the existing ancillary service
offering and understanding its impact on other services such
as primary frequency response, which could eventually aid the
creation of an appropriate market for inertia.
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